




1AD Iron Brigade HUMINT Operations Lessons Learned In a Low Intensity Combat Environment

An aerial photograph of an industrial complex, possibly a power plant or refinery, featuring several tall smokestacks and various industrial buildings. In the foreground, there is a body of water, likely a river or a large reservoir, and some greenery. The sky is hazy.

Purpose

**Provide TTP's on how
to conduct HUMINT
Operations in a Low
Intensity Combat
Urban Environment.**

Why HUMINT ...

- High Intensity Conflict **targets enemy formations, vehicles, key infrastructure and C2 nodes** readily identified by technical means.
- Low Intensity Conflict is **characterized by small units operations, unconventional methods or Non-Formulated Doctrine**, financing and communications
- Religion, ideologues, language & tribal **affiliations play a major role.**

As a result...

- Technical means of gathering intelligence **are not sufficient.**


Bottom Line: Brigades and Battalions, in order to be successful, had to acquire other means to gather, assess, exploit and action intelligence.

Low Intensity Operating Environmental Considerations

- **Tribal Influence & Loyalties**
- **Religious Demographics**
- **Employment / Unemployment**
- **Education Level**
- **Religious Affiliation & Commitment**
- **Language barriers**
- **Population densities**
- **Infrastructure & High Value Assets**
- **Media Interest & Reach**
- **Local Government Maturity**
- **Role of Political Parties or Emerging Political Groups**



BAGHDAD CITY MAP/ 2BCT AI




BDE


- over 500 ~~AO~~ schools in BDE AO
- 40 + embassies
- Ba'ath Party/Intel HQ's
- 20 + political parties
- CPA / Green Zone

Environment


- over 5 million in city
- Mixed religions & Cultures
- Ba'ath party boundaries
- Tribal breakdown
- 9 major districts



KARADAH DISTRICT




- **5 neighborhoods**
- **University of Baghdad & Tech College**
- **Entrance to Green Zone**
- **Former Military & Ba'ath Housing**



24

Wide spectrum of attacks required a new way to look at the enemy




TF 1-6 TARGETING PRIORITIES

1. Attacks against coalition forces resulting in SI/KIA
2. AQ or AMZ
3. IZ Mudj
4. Muqtada militia
5. IED makers
6. Attacks against ISF resulting in WIA/KIA
7. Religious Insurgent leaders
8. FRE leader/operative
9. Weapons dealers
10. Weapons cache's

Discovery Learning - As our HUMINT sources became more mature, a clearer picture of the enemy emerged and so did the abundance of targets

IR STATUS

As of: Jun 03



Jun '03

- IR's answered based on observed incidents.
- HUMINT sources predominately "Walk-Ins."
- Patrols were able to answer IR's concerning infrastructure (SWEAT).


Jun '04

- Majority of IR's answered by directed HUMINT actions.
- IR's focused on key or actionable targets.
- Patrols continue to confirm infrastructure and direct action.

Reactive versus Predictive Intel


IR STATUS

As of: Jun 04



Intel Driven Operations

HUMINT Support To Targeting



Establishing a HUMINT Structure

Considerations:

- Recruit the Right People

- Interpreters, former trusted informants to establish contact w/ key leaders (Sheiks), local security forces-police, civil defense corps, military, FPS, known sympathizers (Shia/Sunni), local employees, captured and released EPW's, political parties (KIC), Key Personnel who has/had the ability to maintain data on Non-Coalition Forces Interest groups

- ID motivation to work (\$ or other incentives)

- Weekly/monthly salary, weapons cards, work assistance in community or government

- Equip the structure

- Thuraya and cell phones, GPS, digital cameras (a picture is worth more than 1,000 words in urban operations), unclassified maps, weapons and authorization paperwork, ID cards-for the agency and for the cover story

- Train the structure

- How to use a GPS, read a map (KIC), what types of information to collect, when, where (targetable data), camera use and maintenance, cover stories (ministry employee), reporting (use the internet; yahoo chat), and determine the informants strengths and weaknesses (Neighborhoods, Tribes, IZ/MM/AQ/FRE).

Vetting must continue every time a source is used.


Overlapping Spheres of HUMINT Coverage

Sunni Group

- Motivation -- Power, Money & Personal Security
- Employed -- Full time as an Intel on Non-Sunni Affiliated Targets & FRE's.

Shia Group

- Motivation -- Power & Security
- Employed - Situational awareness on Wahabbi Extremists and FRE's.



Kurdish Group

- Motivation -- Power & Security
- Employed - Situational awareness on FRE's and religious

**Overlapping organizations
provided for threat and target
refinement**

BDE (SSA) and BN STRUCTURES

2BCT STRIKER SERVICE AGENCY				
Informant		Job		Sample Mission
Ladka		Taxi Driver		Hotel Recons
Karim		Works for IO		R&S to Confirm Targets
Jackal		Professional Intelligence Collector		AI/AQ
Jassim		Business Man		Fedayeen/FRL
Ahmed		Reporter		Universities
Generals		Retired Military		Black List

BN Organizations

- KIC, SCICO, TIA, Goodfellas
- Mosque infiltrators, NAC intelligence gathering, post-attack infiltrators (working a VBIED crowd)
- Some indigenous groups run their own networks (sub-sources)

Remember, Today's Informant can be Tomorrow's Enemy


HUMINT Procedural Controls

All informant HUMINT reports submitted thru senior 351B/E Warrant Officer-Quality and procedural assurance

- Informant registers maintained at TF and BDE levels to de-conflict and monitor operations.
- Sensitized to unit's needs
- Standardized pay rates
- Informants managed by one person only-limits potential informant counter-surveillance.
- Empowerment of Senior HUMINT Warrant Officer for oversight Ensures Off-Limits Organizations (MEK, IIS) are not being used
- THT's conduct HUMINT oversight inspections of TF's on a monthly basis
- THT's conduct counter-intelligence screening of "suspect" informants
- Senior HUMINT Warrant Officer had a Inspection Programs not


We Must Restructure Ourselves

BN Intel Structure



We Must Restructure Ourselves

BDE Intel Structure



* Requires additional 96B/11B/11A manning (New structure created a new demand from BDE COMMO)

OPN STRIKER THUNDER III JULY 2003



- **BDE Operation consisting of 3 Maneuver Bns**
- **Cordon & Search of over 1500 homes targeting just 10 personnel**
- **Based on intelligence gathered by patrols.**
- **10 hour operation resulted in 8 of the 10 targets captured**

OPN ELTON NOV 2003

**OBJ
Apollo**

MISSION SUMMARY

- BDE OPN with one BN & BRT
- 36 Targets in 18 OBJ Houses
- HUMINT ID'ed Cell, personnel, homes & potential contraband to be found
- OPN resulted in the capture of **the principal financier of foreign fighter activity in Iraq**, 4 x cell leaders, 7 x weapons suppliers, 2 x financiers, and 8 x insurgent operators.

**OBJ
Gemini**

Al Rasheed Rocket Attack

The October 8, 2003 rocket attack on the Al Rasheed forced the Brigade to use HUMINT assets to gather information on personnel responsible for the attack. The source discovered large

HUMINT Lessons Learned

We cannot penetrate a closed society in BDUs. We must...

- **Develop a HUMINT structure that supports our operations**
- **Adapt & restructure our Intel Team to Support HUMINT Operations**
- **Develop a targeting process**